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D
EBATES ABOUT GLOBALIZATION are a
wake-up call for anthropologists to de-
velop different approaches to the study
of culture and society. Beyond the mantra about
cultural flows and hybridity, magical states and
enchanted economies, we need to grasp the
strategic aspect of global interconnectedness,
the dynamic production of social space, and the
political implications of contemporary transfor-
mation of society and culture. Specifically, this
paper will address the impact of economic glob-
alization on the respatialization of state sover-
eignty, and the reterritorialization of capital,
both processes that participate in the cultural
valorization of culture and civilization in South-
east Asia. 
Globalization studies encompass a range of
approaches. Anthropologists have participated
in the conversation by questioning the natural-
ized territorial space of the state, focusing on
emerging transnational networks and collective
consciousness in an era of intensified flows
(Appadurai 1996; Ong 1999). Other social the-
orists, pointing to the growth of transnational
corporations, financial regimes, and informa-
tional technologies, stress the transformation in
organization of social relations and transac-
tions, paying particular attention to the exten-
sity of networks, the velocity of flows, and the
intensity of enmeshment of nations and soci-
eties in global processes which are historically
unprecedented (Castel 1992; Held et al. 1999).
They thus use terms such as thick or thin globa-
lization to describe the thickening or thinning
of relationships or activity that unevenly mold
the world into “a shared social space.” (Held et
al. op. cit.: 21-22) As a consequence of the be-
havior of economic globalization, John Ruggie
points to “the unbundling” of state power and
national territory, a shift that has wide implica-
tions for our understanding of global politics
(Ruggie 1998, chap. 7).
But, as social geographers have argued,
what has been underplayed in different ap-
proaches is the historical role of global capital-
ism in making space as a constitutive element
of contemporary geographical reorganization
(Brenner 1999; Lefebvre 1992). Indeed, the ex-
pansionary logic of capitalism has reached the
final frontiers of our worlds. Global capital has
rescaled social spaces, from the geographies of
trading blocs to the national territory of state
power, to the intimate crevices of human cells.
What researchers have not done, however, is 
to link such multi-scalar reconfiguration of the
spaces of power to changing forms of ruling
and the cultural production of norms. 
I believe that anthropologists have an analyti-
cal contribution to make that will enrich our
grasp of the remaking of strategies of govern-
ment, the production of cultural norms, and the
practice of politics in the current “reconfigu-
rations of superimposed social spaces that un-
folds simultaneously upon multiple geographical
Aihwa Ong GLOBALIZATION 
AND NEW STRATEGIES 
OF RULING IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
scales.” (Brenner op. cit.: 42) We have a tradi-
tion of analyzing the transformation of social 
organization at different community, societal,
national, and regional levels, and our strength is
in the study of cultural change and norm-making
within particular historical conjunctions of polit-
ical, economic and social transformations. Some
anthropological approaches to globalization
have tended to stress the imaginary, the magical,
and the symbolic dimensions of peoples’
responses in developing countries (Comaroff
and Comaroff 1998), but have little to say about
the kinds of social relations and forms that have
been produced in the encounters with global
market forces. Culture-making is often reduced
to a minimalist defensive reworking of a residual
tradition, not part of the critical processes con-
structing state-society relations in the modern
era of globalization. The state is treated as the ab-
stract object of cultural resistances. Sometimes,
“the postcolony” is invoked simply as a rhetorical
gesture, a move that carelessly suggests that all
“postcolonial” formations have fixed locations
on a linear trajectory of development. The idea of
postcoloniality does not take into account how
particular states or networks are actually con-
nected with global markets forces, nor do it draw
attention to specific mechanisms of market-polit-
ical interactions. 
A popular view suggests that globalizing
forces have engendered “deeply disjunctive rela-
tionships among human movement, technolog-
ical flow, and financial transfers.” (Appadurai
op. cit.: 35) There are indeed severe contradic-
tions in economic globalization, and the effects
of global markets are highly uneven and polariz-
ing, fracturing the world into different zones, and
individual societies into extremes of rich and
poor. But the disjunctures are not between the 
so-called ethnoscapes, financescapes and media-
scapes, but between zones with extreme concen-
tration of media, financial, and technological
powers, and other areas where such powers are
virtually-absent. How and why, in an era of glob-
alization, the respatializing and rescaling of po-
litical and economic power have thickened or
thinned particular kinds of social networks
across different zones of wealth and poverty are
questions we could be asking. Different coun-
tries respond in different ways to neoliberal
challenges, and it would be useful to unpack the
state as a unified entity. We need to identity and
analyze how different strategies of ruling re-
spond to globalizing forces, and how new forms
of governance produce particular effects on 
subject-making and on political practices.
My approach is guided by the assumption
that global capitalism has induced critical
changes in the forms that sovereignty can take,
as space becomes a constitutive element in the
reorganization of state-market relations. Global
capitalist processes now compel states to reor-
ganize state power at different levels and scales
within and beyond the space of the nation. The
rescaling of the state and of transnational net-
works of production and trade has radically
changed state power, bringing about a gradua-
tion of ruling practices, of national territory, and
of what means to be a subject, and even human,
in relation to state and capital. I will build my
case by answering the following questions
about globalization: a) What are fundamental
changes in state practices? b) What is the impact
of the market agenda on the rescaling of sub-
national and regional spaces? c) Does global-
ization or its crisis promote civil society?
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What Are Fundamental Changes in State
Practices?
We can now accept that claims about the demise
of the state are a non-issue in globalization de-
bates. The question is whether the state systems
are “yielding in some instances to postmodern
configuring of political space?” (Ruggie op.
cit.: 174-175) What changes in our analysis 
of the state are necessary, and what kinds of vo-
cabulary can be used?
My first move is to specify what kinds of
states we are talking about when we deal with
the encounter with globalization. The relative
positions of nation-states in the global ranking
of rich and poor countries influence the ways
globalizing forces penetrate and rework their
national spaces, and by extension, reorganize
regional political spaces. For instance, in parts
of Asia and Latin America, some industrializ-
ing countries have emerged as critical sites for
global production, and as emerging markets for
speculative capital. 
The so-called Asian tiger states – S. Korea,
Singapore, Hong Kong (SAR), Malaysia,
and Thailand – have reached a stage when the
technical-organizational aspects of economic
development are handled by private enterprises.
Their primary “postdevelopmental strategy” is
to manage populations in relation to the de-
mands of world markets. While South American
countries may borrow aspects of a postdevelop-
mental strategy, what is distinctive to Asian post-
developmentalism is its claims of cultural unity
and stability combined with the selective adop-
tion of neoliberal practices that have made South-
east Asia seem more “bankable” in the eyes of
global corporations.
There are two aspects to postdevelopmental
strategy. On the one hand, there is the strength-
ening of nationalist concepts or ideologies
about civilization, be it neo-Confucianism or
the New Islam. On the other hand, there is the
proliferation of state policies and practices
through which different segments of the popu-
lation relate or do not relate to the global mar-
ket economy. 
Benedict Anderson (1991) has maintained
that nations are imagined communities, provid-
ing meanings linked with the past, tradition,
and sacrifice that people can identify. But glob-
alization has induced a different representa-
tional strategy of national culture. In Southeast
Asia, the discourses of New Islam and neo-Con-
fucianism stress not merely continuity but also a
resurgence of ancient traditions. After the inter-
ruption of colonialism, we are supposed to wit-
ness a transformation that goes beyond past
achievements to meet new challenges of moder-
nity. In Malaysia, a burgeoning sense of eco-
nomic power and cosmopolitanism has inspired
a narrative of the nation with an emphasis on Is-
lamic resurgence. The deputy prime minister
wrote a book called Asian Renaissance (1997)
that harks back to the precolonial centuries
when Islam was the force that brought com-
merce and splendor to Southeast Asian trading
empires. This narrative claims that a new era of
Asian cultural vitality and autonomy has
dawned, due to religious revivalism, the end of
socialism, and the vibrant economic transfor-
mation of the region. Malaysia and other na-
tions have overcome their “capitulation to
Atlantic powers” and are now “reflowering at
the dawn of a new millennium.” Spiritual tradi-
tions linked with Islam “possess the intellectual
capacity to perceive the cultural unity of Asia,
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its meta-culture.” (Anwar 1997: 187) The re-
vival of the term “civilization” by Samuel Hunt-
ington (1996) seems to validate such nationalist
claims of “enduring” Asian civilizations that
can engender a modern sense of regionalism.
Along with the discourse of New Islam, the
secular Malaysian state moved to gain control
of Islamic law from “chauvinist” and “narrow-
minded ulamas.” (Ong 2000) The New Islam
narrative is now infused with messages of eco-
nomic development and entrepreneurialism,
wedding a religious re-flowering to a common
destiny of new prosperity. Islam is reframed 
as a faith that “wants its followers to be self-
sufficient, independent, and progressive.”
(Khoo 1995: 165) What politicians have in
mind is not another Iran but rather a state in
which a moderate and reasonable Islam helps
to strengthen the state by working and meshing
smoothly with global capitalism. But how does
the new Islamic normativity inform new modes
of ruling that treat different parts of the popula-
tion according to their roles in capitalism? 
In his discussion of “the art of government,”
Foucault notes that modern sovereignty is no
longer simply a “supreme power” over the
population (1977: 95, 1991). He notes that
“there are several forms of government among
which the prince’s relation to his state is only
one particular mode; while on the other hand,
all these other kinds of government are internal
to the state and society.” (Foucault 1991: 91)
Different modalities of state power coexist, and
the distinctive modern forms are concerned
with “governing” populations, individuals, and
oneself. In short, “the art of government… is 
essentially concerned with answering the ques-
tion of how to introduce economy – that is to
say, the correct manner of managing individ-
uals, goods and wealth within the family… into
the management of the state.” (Ibid.: 92) State
management of the population thus requires
different modalities of government, based on
mechanisms of calculation, surveillance, con-
trol and regulation that set the terms and are
constitutive of a domain of social existence.
The different forms of regulation of course do
not mean that states do not, now and again,
here and there, resort to police and military ac-
tion against their own people.
The new modalities of state power have
come from the adoption of neoliberal norms by
neo-authoritarian Southeast Asian states. Robert
Castel observes the emergence, in neoliberal
states, of “differential modes of treatment of
populations, which aim to maximize the returns
on doing what is profitable and to marginalize
the unprofitable.” (1991: 294) Asian tiger states,
which combine authoritarian and economic lib-
eral features, are not neoliberal formations, but
their insertion into the global economy has re-
quired selective adoption of neoliberal norms
for managing populations in relation to corpo-
rate requirements. Such differential modes of
government overlap with the pre-existing state
discourses that politically and socially differen-
tiate the population by ethnicity, gender, class
and nationality, thus producing ethnoracial enti-
ties. In countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Thai-
land and to some extent Singapore, certain
groups become the object of special treatment
based on biopolitical calculations of their ca-
pacity to work with global capitalist enterprises.
To remain globally competitive, the Asian tiger
state makes different kinds of investments in
different subject populations, privileging one
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ethnicity over another, the male over the female,
and the professional over the manual worker.
Different sectors of the population are subjected
to different technologies of regulation and risk,
and in the process assigned different social fates. 
Although the state has made major invest-
ments in the biopolitical improvements of the
Malay majority, the pastoral benefits have
been skewed in favor of the middle and upper
middle classes. These so-called “preferred
Malays” have been given extensive benefits in
education, employment, and business activi-
ties, and groomed by the government to take
their places in new investment centers, and
high-tech industrial parks. They are groomed
by the government to become Muslim entre-
preneurs who can play the game of global cap-
italism, alongside ethnic Chinese and foreign
businessmen. In addition, preferred Malays
have special access to political power that en-
ables them to enjoy special tax breaks and state
bailouts for their risky ventures (Jomo 1998).
The Malay elite thus enjoys both state pastoral
care and corporate citizenship (or crony cap-
italism) in a time of astonishing economic
growth. 
Another modality of governing regulates mi-
grant workers and factory workers in the free
trade zones that are administered by semi-official
corporate agencies catering to the conditions of
global capital. The majority of these workers are
young Malay women, subjected to labor disci-
pline in the old sense, as well Foucaudian-type
social regulations (including Islamic surveil-
lance) that transform them into skilled and disci-
plined workers. Foreign workers like Filipino
maids have limited rights and are subject to ex-
pulsion during economic downturns.
The third modality of governing is a mix of
civilizing and disqualifying policies directed
towards populations who are consider uncom-
petitive and who resist state efforts to make
them more productive in the eyes of the state.
Administrators and developers view aboriginal
groups as backward and wasteful, frequently
an obstacle to state projects (dam-building)
and corporate development (golf courses, tim-
ber plantations). Officials seek to lure the abo-
rigines away from their nomadic life in the
jungles and persuade them to become settlers
like the Malay peasants. Jungle dwellers who
resist the civilizing missions of schools, seden-
tary agriculture, markets, and Islam are left to
their own devices in the midst of destruction
caused by the encroaching logging companies.
Generally, aboriginal groups in practice enjoy
very limited protection vis-à-vis their territory,
their livelihood, or their cultural identity. In
O’Donnell’s terms, such aboriginal populations,
unprotected by rights and often exposed to 
violence, dwell in the “brown” areas of newly
democratized countries (1993: 1361). Irreden-
tist and outlaw groups also dwell in the brown
areas, and SE Asia is riddled with such internal
colonies of poverty and neglect. Frequently, the
state seeks to evict rebel populations and open-
up their resource-rich areas to timber logging
and dam construction. 
Graduated sovereignty then, as I have dis-
cussed it, refers to the differential treatment of
populations – through schemes of biopolitical
disciplining and pastoral care – that differently
insert them into the processes of global capital-
ism. These gradations of governing may be in a
continuum, but they overlap with pre-formed
racial, religious, and gender hierarchies, and
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further fragment citizenship for people who are
all nominally speaking citizens of the same
country. 
What are the implications of graduated sov-
ereignty for Southeast Asia as a region? Some
observers, seeing a bunch of islands, assume
that the area is not well-integrated as a region.
Indeed, the eight member-country Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not
succeeded as a free-trade area, mainly because
the economies are not complementary, but
rather compete with each other in their export-
production (Mattli 1999: 169-171). ASEAN
has been more important as a political entity to
fend off external threats. For instance, ASEAN
recently declared itself a nuclear-free zone. But
even in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the
countries have not been able to agree on a set of
norms governing regional capital flows and
currency trading. 
Instead, graduated sovereignty is linked to
two non-political forms of regional integration,
undertaken mainly by global enterprises and
ethnic Chinese economic networks. Global cap-
ital, led mainly by Japanese firms, has redrawn
the economic space of the region. During the
era of economic take-off in the 1980s and early
1990s, Japanese foreign direct investments have
been the greatest in the region (almost $60 bil-
lion in 1990), followed by Taiwanese capital
(ibid.: 175). Massive investments have stimu-
lated new strategies of regional sourcing and
intra-industry trade. Such corporate arran-
gements have produced growth triangles that 
integrate portions of two or more national
economies. These transnational production net-
works are based on cost-benefit calculations for
doing business in the region, using the time-
space coordinates of flexible production tech-
niques (Harvey 1989) to gain access to and con-
trol over diverse forms of labor and resources in
adjacent national territories. There are four or
more growth triangles that straddle nations in
the archipelago, and plans for a new production
zone that cuts across mainland Southeast Asia.
The largest growth triangle is Sijori which
draws cheap Indonesian female workers and
raw resources, Malaysian technical staff, and
Singaporean managers into a single production
network. As part of the system of graduated
sovereignty, GTs are administered by quasi-
governmental agencies that take over the local
functions of the state without challenging its
formal sovereignty. 
Perhaps an unintended effect of graduated
sovereignty is to reinforce the ethnic Chinese
networks that criss-cross the region. The per-
ceived biases of state policies towards ethnic
Chinese minorities in Malaysia, Indonesia and
Thailand, the rise of huge family-owned busi-
nesses, and the lure of market reforms in China
since the 1980s have all increased ethnic Chi-
nese capital flows and extended their regional
networks, now spanning sites in SE Asia and in
China. After the Tiananmen crackdown, when
US and Japanese capital fled China, overseas
Chinese investments made up for the outflow. It
is estimated that about 80 % of foreign invest-
ments in China have come from the Chinese di-
aspora. Some writers have gone so far as to
claim that overseas Chinese, not the nation-
state, are “the mother of China’s [economic]
revolution.” The economic term for this 
regional integration is Greater China (Da
Zhonghua), an economic space of banking and
trade that includes coastal China, Taiwan, and
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much of Southeast Asia, and whose combined
foreign reserves exceed that of Japan, making
the bloc Asia’s first rank economic giant (Ong
1999: 60). China has rejected the Greater China
category as an affront to its sovereignty, but its
national space has nevertheless become deeply
enmeshed with transnational trade networks
flowing out of Southeast Asia. Globalization
has induced an embedded regionalism, one that
has been articulated in terms of a homogeniz-
ing set of Asian values. 
Thus, the term deterritorialization, used to
suggest the encroachment of global capital on
sovereignty territory, is at best imprecise when
used to describe cross-border flows of capital.
Nor does it specify the actual mechanisms for ad-
justing modes of ruling, the meaning and forms
of sovereign rule. We need to discover how par-
ticular states come to adopt neoliberal norms for
the differential management of its population,
and investigate how a particular kind of strategy
does not characterize an entire national space
(neocorporatism for the preferred elites, brown
areas for aboriginal others, and transnationalism
for ethnic others). Such graduation of sover-
eignty in relation to market forces have regional
implications, indicating that the state is very
strong in certain areas where its protections of
special rights are very significant, while in other
areas it is structurally irrelevant because of flexi-
bility in dealing with corporations which leave
the state unable to control the exit and influx of
capital into transnational networks.
What Is the Impact of the Market Agenda
on National and Regional Spaces?
The series of devaluations of Asian currencies
in late 1997 plunged Southeast Asian states into
a crisis of sovereignty. The very strategy of
graduated sovereignty that embeds society in
global production and financial markets can be
their undoing, exposing them to disruptive eco-
nomic forces. Asian states have responded in
two interesting ways: Indonesia (like Thailand)
submitted to the economic prescriptions of the
IMF, while Malaysia resisted, instead reimpos-
ing its territorial state sovereignty.
The so-called Asian financial crisis was
viewed by the international press as the out-
come of reckless borrowing and lending, the
building of megaprojects, and the lack of mar-
ket controls in the tiger economies. Western 
observers tend to see the problem as one caused
exclusively by crony capitalism or “lack of
transparency” in economic practice. What is
needed, they argue, is a heavy dose of neoli-
beral rules of global market efficiency imposed
mainly through the International Monetary
Fund on third world politicians. Asian ob-
servers point to the fact that global companies
and bankers have been happy to work with
these same problems for decades, and global
institutions like The World Bank (1993: 9) have
lauded the capitalist take-off in Asia. Politi-
cians like Malaysia’s Mahathir, who has been
criticized for crony capitalism, preferred to
blame international financiers as the “rogue
speculators” bent on destroying weak countries
in their crusade for open societies (NST 1999).
Indeed, while Asian economies are guilty of
economic irrationality in their practices, very
little attention has been paid to irrational finan-
cial markets that have made integration into the
global economy the source for both the
strengthening and weakening of the state.
Gradually, as the financial crisis unfolded
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across a number of major countries, more ob-
servers admitted that the crisis was fueled by
speculation in hot money and market panics
that engendered massive outflows. Particularly
troublesome were not only the effects of un-
stable markets on emerging states, but also the
moral hazards that may require the IMF and
advanced states to bail out bad loans by profli-
gate investors. In any case it is difficult if not
impossible to distinguish between explosive
growth and speculative bubbles, and debate
continues about the causes of the crash.
The Asian crisis had an immediate effect on
state sovereignty, providing an opportunity for
neoliberal global agenda to be installed in key
institutions in the national space of developing
countries. The IMF represents the strategic as-
pect of “disciplinary neoliberalism” (Gill 1997:
214) whereby emerging states are subjected to
rules that intensify their subordination to global
market forces. The battered Thai state had little
choice but to adopt IMF prescriptions which
transformed the financial crisis into a full-
blown economic crisis. The collapse of credit
forced the government to pass laws that open
once-closed sectors of the economy to foreign
companies. This move ignited a wave of strikes
as laid-off state workers protested “Stop selling
the country!” while US investors returned to
buy state enterprises at bargain-basement
prices. A local businessman complained that the
Thai government had “slavishly” obeyed the
IMF. He went on: “That the government does so
without… a sense of protection of the future of
our national interests is nothing short of despi-
cable.” (SF Chronicle 1999) 
Another example of the loss of national 
financial control is an IMF-sponsored Indo-
nesian “state agency” to seize the assets of com-
panies in order to bail-out banks. The Indone-
sian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) is
formally charged with getting back loans worth
$35 billion in order to revive banks and to de-
velop accountability in the economy. Its larger
claim is to uproot crony capitalism, a goal that
is unlikely to succeed since IBRA itself is al-
ready entangled in doing state favors. Instead,
IBRA’s job pays money back to global banks
which had poured loans into Indonesia. They
are welcomed back to purchase huge corpora-
tions that used to be linked to the Suharto gov-
ernment. While the IMF prescriptions are
necessary to improve banking practices and cur-
tail corruption in high places, industrializing
countries are now subjected to the same rules of
benefiting capitalist interests, and their popula-
tions more vulnerable to global market forces. 
Only a few countries have challenged the
view that money should be allowed to move
unimpeded around the world. Mahathir of
Malaysia was denounced in global capitals as
an economic retrograde when he imposed con-
trols on capital flows in and out of his country.
But Mahathir had merely followed the sugges-
tion of Paul Krugman of MIT who argued that
developing countries must restrict exposure to
capital flows, and that a temporary regulation of
money markets will allow the economy to re-
cover faster than IMF-prescriptions. Other
countries that reasserted their financial autono-
my vis-à-vis global money markets are Hong
Kong, where the government intervened to
drive foreign speculators out of the real estate
market, and Chile, which imposed an exit fee to
regulate bank loans. China and India, which do
not allow their currencies to be traded outside
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the country, weathered the financial storm much
better than Asian tigers because they are not
vulnerable to a sudden withdrawal of capital.1
Their actions recall Polyani’s (1957) obser-
vation that modern society is propelled by the
double dynamic of the expansion of market
forces on the one hand, and the reactions of so-
ciety to protect itself against capital’s socially
destructive and polarizing impact on the other.
Contemporary neoliberal globalization has in-
tensified this double movement between market
and society, and intensified the global exposure
to uncertainties and risks. It is more than a year
later, and the economies that resisted unlimited
market speculation are recovering, but still lan-
guishing are the countries that adopted the IMF
regime of high interest rates and open markets.
Jeffry Sachs of Harvard sums it all up: “The
year has been a fiasco, and so has the [US] pol-
icy. Asia would have been better if the IMF had
never set foot in these countries.” (NYT 1998)
This is perhaps too hasty a judgement.
There is still a healthy debate about the plusses
and minuses of the “materialization” of the
global market agenda in the space of the nation
(Sassen 1998). The lesson of the crisis, I argue,
is that globalization has made it impossible to
think about transnational relations in simply
market-versus-state terms.
The crisis has demonstrated in the most
naked terms that many states are unable to con-
trol significant parts of their national functions,
and would have fared worse in the long run
with the adoption of some norms, rules and
practices of a globalized economy system.
The larger point for the sovereignty of Asian
countries is that neoliberal norms of regulation
can mean a lot of different things. Here the
issue of graduation can help show that for
states at a particular point of historical devel-
opment, control over certain areas can be very
strong, as in the management of the population
under postdevelopmentalism, but in certain
other areas like national finance, regulation is
near-absent because it is irrelevant, or sup-
planted, by political flexibility in doing inter-
national business (or crony capitalism). Thus,
for example, Malaysia has demonstrated an in-
teresting mix of graduated controls: it rejected
global market norms in monetary and fiscal
policies, and continues to depend on political
patronage for making decisions about national
wealth, spending, and taxation. On the one
hand, it seems to be protecting society against
roving flows of global capital, on the other
hand it is preserving an exclusive corporate
citizenship for the preferred few, against the in-
terest of the majority.
At the regional level, the result of the crisis
has been for states to adopt neoliberal techno-
logies for monetary cooperation. The IMF has
drafted a Code of Good Practices on Trans-
parency (1999) to guide a new “architecture of
the international monetary and financial system.”
The crisis has also spurred Anglo-American lead-
ers to talk about “a new Bretton Woods,” to re-
assert global norms of an “embedded liberalism”
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1. But in Washington, defenders of neoliberalism warned
about the dangers of economic isolation, and hoped that
the Malaysian economy, which is the darling of American
electronic companies, would go down in flames. The
president of a major fund investing in emerging markets
admitted: “If the Malaysian experiment is successful, and
other Asian countries are still struggling a year from now,
it could lead to some disillusionment with naked capital-
ism and Anglo-Saxon markets.” (NYT 1998)
(Ruggie op. cit., chap. 7) that will not subordi-
nate national economic objectives to global fi-
nancial discipline.2 However, short of concrete
action for the protection of the global public
good, SE Asian states have begun to consider
the formation of regional currency clusters to
reduce their exposure to market risks.3 There are
recommendations for setting two regional cur-
rency regimes – for the more and less developed
ASEAN nations – with fixed exchange rates tied
to the value of a group of currencies, and not
subject to political influence. Significantly, the
program entities entrusted with such a reconfig-
uration of ASEAN identity themselves as East
Asian or Far Eastern (NST 1999). The creation
of such an East Asian regional currency bloc
means the acceleration of processes towards
“dis-synchronization” in economic cycles in
Asia, Europe, and North America (Beddoes
1999; Smadja 1998). In short, the impact of
globalization and its crises on the reconstitution
of the regional cannot simply be attributed to the
“clash of civilizations,” (Huntington 1996) but
rather to the ways political economic strategies
reframe normative values of identity and diffe-
rentiation on a regional scale. 
Of course, in other parts of the world, market
forces have produced other forms of regional-
ization in which capital accumulation and neo-
liberal norms are thin or absent. N. Korea and
parts of Africa have been disconnected from the
global production of wealth (Ferguson 2000)
and they suffer from a different set of market
risks. So at the level of the globe as well, one can
talk about the gradation of zones of extreme
privilege associated with the ethos of embedded
liberalism, of emerging areas developing norms
of limited financial liberalization, and other
areas where market regulation is absent. A
Citibank manager thinking about the tradeable
assets of particular regions, divides the world
into “bankable” and “unbankable” areas, and it
is such converging forms of regionalization that
increasingly fracture pre-existing differences,
shaping and reproducing the ways regions and
countries come to think of themselves as differ-
ent kinds of civilization.
Does Globalization or Its Crisis Intensify 
Political Activism?
It should be clear by now that the economic
liberalization of Asian countries has depended
on the state to modernize the economy and so-
ciety. Globalization has strengthened the so-
called authoritarian states in Southeast Asia,
but the strength of the Asian tiger state lies in
the fact that no single strategy of government
characterizes the entire national space. Asian
postdevelopmentalism is based on different
modes for governing different parts of the pop-
ulation that can be linked or unlinked from
market investments. For years, NGO activists
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2. The original 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement inaugu-
rated our current post-1945 growth of global finance.
Keynes, as Britain’s chief negotiator at Bretton Woods,
strongly maintained that national monetary autonomy
was essential to the successful management of a macro-
economy policy geared towards full employment. The
United States negotiator agreed with the decision to 
resist Wall Street’s opposition to capital controls. The
IMF needs to return to its original commitment to the
promotion and maintenance of high levels of employ-
ment and real income as the primary objectives of eco-
nomic policy (Held et al. op. cit.: 199-200).
3. See M. Khor (1999), for a discussion of the merits of a
move towards limited financial liberalization.
fighting for environmental rights, social and
economic rights, and the rights of indigenous
peoples have been tightly controlled and muz-
zled; “quarantined” in university forums and
hotel rooms, they could only create “turbulence
in a glass” (NYT 1999).4 For years as well,
insurgent groups in resource-rich regions have
struggled against military repression by the
state. 
The impact of the financial crisis has been to
expose the extreme contrast between the islands
of neocorporatist privilege, the production zones
of cheap labor, the brown spots of jungle-
dwellers, and the internal colonies of extreme 
repression. Hundreds of NGOs had existed in
Suharto’s Indonesia, but with his downfall, the
political climate has opened up. The reformasi
movements have gone on to mobilize women,
workers, peasants, ethnic minorities, bringing
heretofore excluded citizens into the realm of
political participation. The result is a broadened
space for NGOs, political parties, and secession-
ist movements to flex their muscles, challenge
state authority, and demand state accountability.
Beck uses the term “unbinding of politics”
to describe the gradual loss of power experi-
enced by the centralized political system, as
sub-political entities, under the jurisdiction of
business, media, or legal institutions, come to
play a bigger role in the production of a new
political culture (1992: 190). Beck is talking
about the situations in modern Western soci-
eties, where the stabilization and establishment
of basic rights, and the protection of such rights
against the encroachments of state power, have
led to “the broad political activization of citi-
zens.” (Ibid.: 190-191, 194-195) But in devel-
oping Asian countries, the birth of a broad new
political culture has not come about through the
systematic implementation and protection of
basic rights. Rather, it is economic crises which
disrupt the sense of general well-being and pol-
itical acquiescence found in privileged sectors
of society. What is distinctive about SE Asian
social movements is the diversity of different
constituencies, engaged in different kinds of
highly localized battles, rather than a coalescing
of forces against the state.
In Indonesia, the reformasi movement is
mainly led by members of the middle classes.
Using the protest slogan KKN: kolusion,
koruption, and nepotism, reformasi NGOs have
been focused on fighting the staggering graft of
the former Suharto regime, seeking to rid the
state of crony capitalism and demanding open
elections.5 The other focus of NGOs activities
is the protests of women’s groups in the after-
math of the torture and gang rape of ethnic mi-
nority women throughout the archipelago.6
Feminist NGOs formed a National Commis-
sion on Violence against Women to fight for
women’s rights in the country. At the same time,
a political ferment built up around the election
of the next president. Hundreds of new political
parties have been formed, among them the 
Indonesia Democracy Party (Partai Democrasi
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4. See F. Loh (1996), for an overview of NGOs in South-
east Asia before the financial crash.
5. For an account of the Suharto family’s amassming of
ill-gotten assets worth $15 billion, see Time Magazine
(May 24, 1999).
6. For a UN fact-finding report on the May 1998 rapes of
minority ethnic women in Java, Sumatra, and East Timor,
see R. Coomaraswarmy (1999). 
Indonesia), led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, and
the Muslim Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN or
National Mandate Party). For the first time, eth-
nic Chinese – some of whom were fed to the
raging crowds by the military – formed a polit-
ical party (Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indone-
sia: PBI) to demand protection of their basic
rights as citizens (Coppel 1999).7
In Malaysia, state legitimacy was challenged
mainly in the area of rule of law, following the
arrest and trail of Anwar Ibrahim, the former
deputy prime minister. Anwar was sacked by
prime minister Mahathir for favoring the adop-
tion of IMF prescriptions; he is in jail after
being brought to trail for abusing his position
and related sexual misdemeanors. His support-
ers, mainly educated and professional members
of the Malay middle class, combining forces
with the activist NGO Aliran, formed a National
Justice Party (Parti-Keadilan Malaysia), with
the slogan “justice, progress, and unity.” For
them, reformasi means exposing and struggling
against state crony capitalism, demands for re-
forms of the judiciary system and the police, and
protection from the arbitrary exercise of state
power. In both countries, a revitalized political
culture is demanding that government actions be
explained and justified to sub-political units, and
that such groups have the right to negotiate state
policy. This is a major step forward for citizens
accustomed to putting their faith in state devel-
opmentalism, and a crucial step in their becom-
ing modern reflexive subjects.
But non-elite political activism is focused
less on reforming the government than in seek-
ing protection from the risks of global market
forces. There is a gap of perception between
middle class activists and the poor and dispos-
sessed, their size newly increased by the mil-
lions of workers laid off from the jobs who have
returned to poverty-stricken neighborhoods and
villages. Historically, the rage against market
uncertainties and crises had focused on local
Chinese as the sacrificial scapegoats.8 In May
1998 and the following weeks, attacked ethnic
Chinese shops, and participated in military in-
stigated rapes of an estimated 168 Chinese girls
and women, twenty of whom subsequently
died.9 The fears engendered by market crashes,
the anonymous speculative mania wrecking the
country’s economy was transfigured into images
of local Chinese shopkeepers hoarding food,
Chinese “traitors” fleeing the country with ill-
gotten capital, and ninja murderers of Muslims.
In some neighborhoods, local vigilante groups
hunted for ninjas, or phantom sorcerers who
were killed on sight (approximately 200 ninjas
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7. Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia is the Indone-
sian national slogan meaning “various, but one; diverse
but united.” The Chinese thus seeks to be recognized as
ethnically different and equal citizens of Indonesia. 
8. Under the Suharto regime, a few Chinese tycoons en-
joyed special political access which enabled them to amss
huge fortunes and dominate sectors of the economy. The
majority of ethnic Chinese, numbering some 4 million,
suffer from the historical legacy of anti-Chinese senti-
ments and legal status as racialized citizens. The Suharto
government, through inaction, had practically “legalized”
attacks on Chinese property and persons (Coppel op. cit.). 
9. A government-sponsored team admitted links between
the rapes and an army unit headed by Suharto’s son-
in-law, then lieutenant general Prabowo Subianto. His
elite special forces (Kopassus) were also involved in the
disappearance of 24 activities earlier in the year. See 
reports in The Jakarta Post, July 14, 1998 and Dec. 
21, 1998.
were killed in Java). The heads of ninjas were
paraded on pikes, a way of keeping invisible
uncertainties and risks at bay. Such grisly muta-
tions of market-induced fears, and the demands
by the masses for some kind of redistribution of
“Chinese” wealth in favor of the “pribumi” in-
digenous population, have been considered in
terms of a possible affirmative-style policy like
the one that exists in Malaysia. But there has
been little consideration of the extremely vul-
nerable position of the majority to volatile mar-
ket conditions. NGOs like the Urban Poor
Consortium and the Walhi, or the leading envi-
ronmental groups, are the few that attend to the
economic consequences of globalization, but
none has yet begun to consider how different
state strategies of development have affected
different areas of the nation.
Then there are the on-going dirty wars in the
pockets of resource-rich areas seeking autonomy
from Jakarta. Middle class reformasi move-
ments in Java are little connected with the strug-
gles of ethnic minorities in the Outer Islands
struggling against military repression. Since
their invasion by Indonesia in 1976, the East
Timorese have struggled to gain independence.
A potentially more dangerous battle is brewing
in Aceh – home to 4 million Muslims, and even
richer in gas, oil, timber, and minerals – because
of the failure of the interim Habibie government
to prosecute past abuses, repressive military con-
trol, and extraction of locally-produced rev-
enues. The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh
Movement) is fueling a Muslim grass-roots
insurgency, with funds from other Muslim coun-
tries. The return of foreign-trained guerrillas and
claims of wide international support have helped
launch a fight for independence. Thus the impact
of the financial crisis on political activities has
been diverse, and it is unlikely that middle class
movements fighting for a less corrupt and more
accountable government in Jakarta will be com-
fortable with demands for greater provincial 
autonomy and the threat of national dismember-
ment. The diversity of political activism reveals
that despite the centralized image of Suharto’s
New Order, or Malaysia’s vision of industrial
progress, these states have adopted different
strategies of government for different parts of
the national space. The effects have been to pro-
duce highly differentiated communities with 
different kinds of political subjectivity, each en-
gaged in an embedded struggle for a different vi-
sion of shared fate, a fate conditioned by their
particular treatment by the state and their links to
or potential for market investments. 
*
*    *
I have argued that economic globalization
has induced small, developing states to experi-
ment with a set of strategies in governing seg-
ments of their population, and administering
certain areas of the national territory, depend-
ing on whether they are linked to or delinked
from global market networks. The graduation
of sovereignty, I have argued, is constituted by
a plethora of norm-making activities. At the
level of the nation, the question becomes of
what kind of civilization the state sees itself as
belonging to; at the level of state-society rela-
tions, cultural norms define who constitutes a
worthy citizen (and who does not); and at the
level of regional integration, regional identity –
the vague set of “Asian values” invoked by
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Asian foreign ministers – is defined against the
more disruptive forces of neoliberal capitalism
associated with the American bloc. 
I also maintain that the anthropological ap-
proach can make a special analytical contribu-
tion to the study of globalization. In this way
anthropologists can demonstrate that we have
something to say about what globalizing forces
do to as well as what they may mean to people
in their particular worlds. Anthropology has a
long tradition of studying the evolution of so-
cial organization, concerned in particular with
linking localities with the larger regional and
global forces that shape their evolution. 
• Our attention to transformations in social
relationships, to cultural production within
shifting power networks, and new interest in
forms of governance are critical tools for study-
ing the strategic aspects of globalization, and
enable us to demonstrate what are distinctive
about the links between market, state, and soci-
ety in a particular part of the world. 
• Our understanding of particular historical
trajectories and contingencies, especially in the
colonial and post-colonial remaking of new na-
tions and alternative modernities, are important
insights in an analysis of the contemporary
global reconstitution of the local, the regional
and the national.
• International relations theorists have
talked about the “unbundling” of national terri-
tories by globalizing processes (Ruggie op.
cit.), but it will be the task of anthropologists to
make analytical specifications about how cer-
tain relationships between market, state, and
society are reworked, and what mechanisms of
regulation and cultural logics accompany such
reconfigurations.
• Our attention to cultural production and
contestation within structures of power, and our
interest in issues of authority make us especially
sensitive to the allegories and cultural normaliz-
ing of forms of governance, and their varied im-
pact on different types of subject formation. 
In short, economic globalization requires us
to rethink issues and strategies of governance
within the space of the national, and the differ-
ent technologies that shape ideas about political
subjectivity and what it means to be human.
What then, is the role of a cosmopolitan hu-
manism today? We can deepen our own reflex-
ive modernity. We can be vigilant about the
neoliberal doctrine that infuses our liberal
thinking, and that induces us to focus on multi-
culturalism while resolutely neglecting the
structures of power in which it is imbricated.
This trend seems reminiscent of an earlier 
anthropological practice of writing about cul-
tural others, but ignoring the colonial structures
that shaped their existence and transformation
(Asad 1973). If we can take our eyes off the
ruins that embody the beauty of that which has
been lost, we can pay attention to the contem-
porary processes that have transformed natives
into contemporary moderns like us. We might
then understand how they have been uprooted
from their social networks, and in what kinds
of new social arrangements they are now re-
embedded. In sum, we might ask what kinds of
modern subjects they are becoming in the new
spaces of globalization, still haunted as they are
by fragments of their old cosmology. 
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Abstract
Aihwa Ong, Globalization and New Strategies of Ruling
in Developing Countries
Debates about globalization are a wake-up call for anthro-
pologists to develop new approaches to the study of culture
and society. There is a classical anthropological tradition
concerned with the study of social function and organiza-
tion on any scale, but we need new categories to analyze
the strategic aspects of contemporary global inter-
connectedness. I will address the impact of economic
globalization on the respatialization of state sovereignty,
and the reterritorialization of capital, both processes that
participate in the valorization of culture and civilization in
SE Asia. In particular, I consider how the interactions be-
tween economic globalization, state, and society have pro-
duced new economic entanglements, social spaces, and
political constellations. This paper will answer three com-
monly asked questions about globalization: a) What fun-
damental changes affect the state? b) What is the impact of
the market agenda on national and social spaces? c) Does
globalization or its crisis intensify political activism? 
Résumé
Aihwa Ong, Globalisation et nouvelles stratégies de gou-
vernement dans les pays en voie de développement
Les débats autour de la globalisation sont une incitation
pour les anthropologues à développer de nouvelles appro-
ches de la culture et de la société. Une tradition classique
de cette discipline s’attache à l’étude de l’organisation et
des fonctions sociales à tous les niveaux, mais nous avons
besoin de nouvelles catégories pour analyser les aspects
stratégiques des interconnexions contemporaines à l’é-
chelle globale. Ce texte traite des effets de la globalisation
économique sur les formes nouvelles d’expression spa-
tiale de l’État souverain, et de la reterritorialisation du ca-
pital, deux processus qui participent de la valorisation de
la culture et de la civilisation dans le Sud-Est asiatique. En
particulier, l’auteur se demande comment les interactions
entre globalisation économique, État et société ont produit
de nouveaux enchevêtrements de relations sociales et de
constellations politiques. Quels sont les changements fon-
damentaux survenus dans les États ? Quel est l’impact du
marché et de ses priorités sur les espaces nationaux et so-
ciaux ? Enfin, la globalisation ou ses crises conduisent-
elles au développement de l’activisme politique ?
